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Abstract 
 In the years, routing protocols in wireless sensor networks (WSN) 
have been substantially investigated by researches. Most state-of-
the-art surveys have focused on reviewing of wireless sensor 
network .In this paper we review the existing secure geographic 
routing protocols for wireless sensor network (WSN) and also 
provide a qualitative comparison of them. 
Keywords- Wireless Sensor Network, Sensor, Geographic 
Routing. 
1. Introduction 
According to great capabilities of WSNs, application of 
them is increasing in recent decade. But, they face to some 
challenges such as limitation of power, memory, CPU and 
etc. these issues of WSNs have a direct effects on 
algorithms that are designed to them because complex 
algorithms need much memory and CPU and they consume 
a great deal of energy. These extreme limitations of 
resource, separate WSNs from traditional networks [1]. 
Based on the natural features of WSNs that distinguish them 
from other wireless networks such as ad hoc networks, 
routing in WSNs has very challenges. First, establishing 
comprehensive structure of address for deploying of the 
certain number of sensor nodes is impossible. So, traditional 
methods based on IP address (IP-based protocols) cannot be 
used to wireless sensor networks. Second, almost all 
applications of sensor networks need to sense the flow of 
data from multiple sources and transfer them to a special 
sink that it is as opposed to communication networks. Third 
if multiple sensors that are deployed in the adjacency of an 
event create same data, the data traffic is generated that it 
has an important redundancy in it. Such redundancy requires 
to be developed by the routing protocols to make energy and 
bandwidth utilization better. Finally, sensor node needs an 
accurate resource management because the resources of 
sensors such as energy, power of sending packet and the 
storage of sensor is restricted [2].  
 
One of the important issues in WSNs is to provide the 
security of sensor nodes. There are various sensor holes as 
sink/black holes, worm holes, Sybil attack and etc. may 
form in a WSN and create network topology variations 
which trouble the upper layer applications [3]. Among all 
attacks, wormhole has more significant threat; because this 
type of attack does not need to compromise a sensor in the 
network and it can create the other type of attack easily. On 
the other hand, using a cryptographic technic cannot prevent 
wormhole attack [4]. 
2. Security Issues and Attacks on Sensor 
Network Routing 
Most wireless sensor networks routing protocols are not 
complicated and they cannot protect themselves against 
large range of attacks. The attacks that can effect on WSNs 
are belonged to one of the following categorizations: 
spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information, selective 
forwarding, sinkhole attacks, Sybil attacks, wormholes, 
HELLO flood attacks, acknowledgement spoofing. The 
descriptions of each attack are mentioned in below [5]. 
2.1. Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing 
Information 
The main goal of most direct attack to routing protocol is to 
alter or modify the information that transmitted among 
nodes. create routing loops, attract or repel network traffic, 
extend or shorten source routes, generate false error 
messages, partition the network, increase end-to-end 
latency, etc. are some side effects of  spoofing, altering, or 
replaying routing information on sensor networks. 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 4, July 2011 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 
 
2.2. Selective Forwarding attack 
If an attacker intercepts or refuses to transmit a certain 
message and either drops it or chooses an arbitrary message 
for sending due to stop important message, the selective 
forwarding attack is occurred.  
 
This attack may be appeared in two forms. In the simplest 
form of this attack, adversaries try to use a malicious node 
for rejecting and dropping all received packets. This type of 
selective forwarding attack operates like a black hole.  
 
A second type of this attack happens when an adversary 
modifies transmitted packets. It is important to mention that 
the selective forwarding attack usually has most effect when 
the attacker is directly on the path of flowing data. But 
adversary can hear the neighbor packets from long distance 
[5]. 
2.3. Sinkhole attacks 
The main goal of attacker in sinkhole is to attract large 
fractions of traffic to a region and constructing a sinkhole 
that the adversary is located in the center of it. For achieving 
this aim, Sinkhole attacks usually perform by making 
attractive a vulnerable node specifically to encircling nodes 
according to the routing algorithm. For example, an attacker 
can broadcast an advertisement or spoof for a very high 
quality route to a sink. Some protocols may try to confirm 
the truth of the quality of route with end-to-end 
acknowledgements including reliability or latency 
information. 
 
The special communication pattern between sensors is one 
of the important reasons that sensor nodes are endangered 
from sinkhole attack. Since all packets in the network use 
and share only one base station, it is enough that 
compromised nodes find a single high quality route to the 
base station in order to influence a potentially large number 
of nodes [6,7]. 
2.4. Sybil attacks 
The base of Sybil attack is that attacker can forge identities 
of nodes. a major side effect of this attack  is to reduce the 
effectiveness of fault-tolerant schemes such as distributed 
storage, multipath routing, and topology maintenance.  
 
Sybil attacks also pose a significant threat to geographic 
routing protocols. In geographical routing protocol, each 
node requires to transmit packet with its neighbors. So a 
node must have just a single set of coordinates from each of 
its neighbors and save them in its table but by utilizing the 
Sybil attack an attacker can be located in more than one 
situation at one time [5, 6]. 
2.5. Wormholes attack 
In wormhole attack, attackers try to create a message 
appears that points away from the network. Wormhole 
attacks usually contain two malicious nodes that situated 
distant from each other. So, it can simply convince these 
two Separated nodes that they are neighbors by sending 
packets between the two of them. On the other hand, an 
adversary by using this attack could convince nodes that 
they are normally situated multiple hops from a base station 
that they are only one or two hops away. If an attacker is 
located near of sink or base station, it can interrupt routing 
by making a well-placed wormhole completely [6].  
2.6. HELLO flood attack 
Hello packets are a specific packet that usually used in 
many wireless sensor protocols. So, in these protocols each 
node needs to transmit HELLO packet for aware its 
neighbors, so that, when a node sends this packet, it may 
imagine that is located within radio range of the sender. 
Sometimes this assumption may be wrong. If an adversary 
transmits information with a sufficient power, every node in 
the network could be convinced that the attacker is its 
neighbor. This attack also can effect on protocols that based 
on localized information exchange between adjacent nodes 
like geographical routing protocol. 
 
It is not essential for attackers to build lawful traffic due to 
utilize the HELLO flood attack. They can easily retransmit 
powerful overhead packets that every node in the network 
can received them [6].   
2.7. Acknowledgment spoofing attack 
The acknowledgment spoofing attack is designed based on 
this goal that a sender believes a frail connection is strong or 
that an unusable node is working. While nodes broadcast 
packet from weak or dead link, the packet may be lost. So, 
an attacker can prepare a selective forwarding attack 
utilizing acknowledgement spoofing by inspiring the certain 
node to send packets on those links [6,7]. 
3. Trust Issues 
Trust and security are two important concepts that they are 
tightly interdependent. For example, cryptography is a 
modern technique for secure system that is dependent 
directly to a trusted key. One of the first definitions for 
trusted is based on Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) 
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other party 
will perform a particular action important to the trust or, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the party” 
[8]. In wired networks, Trust is usually provided by 
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applying indirect trust mechanisms, such as trusted 
certification agencies and authentication servers. But Trust 
establishment in wireless sensor networks is still an open 
and challenging field, because these trust relationships in 
such a networks are extremely susceptible to attacks. Also, 
the absence of fixed trust infrastructure, limited resources, 
ephemeral connectivity and availability, shared wireless 
medium and physical vulnerability, make trust 
establishment virtually impossible. To overcome these 
problems, to establish trust in wireless networks should be 
used a number of assumptions including pre-configuration 
of nodes with secret keys, or presence of an omnipresent 
central trust authority. 
 
Asad Amir Pirzada and et al (2004) suggested and 
implemented a trusted model based on an effort/return 
mechanism. In this model, the trust is computed based on 
the information that each one node can gather from the other 
nodes in passive mode.  By analyzing the received, 
forwarded and overheard packets, vital information about 
other nodes can be collected. Possible events that can be 
recorded in passive mode are included Frames received, 
Data packets forwarded, Control packets forwarded, Data 
packets received, Data forwarded, Data received, etc. 
Information that is retrieved from these events can be 
grouped into one trusted category and used to compute trust 
in other nodes in specific situations [9]. 
4. Overview of protocols 
According to the large number of nodes that is deployed in 
the many of applications of sensor networks, it is impossible 
to dedicate comprehensive identifiers to each node. So, it is 
difficult to find out the unique way among sensors that 
deployed randomly for transmitting data. On the other hand, 
non-use of specific algorithms is not definitely useful 
regarding energy efficiency. Routing protocols is the best 
method to select a group of sensor nodes and applying data 
collection throughout the retransmission of data has been 
considered [10]. One of the important routing protocols in 
wireless sensor networks is Geographical routing protocol. 
The main strategy that used in geographical routing is 
named greedy forwarding in which the sender transmit 
packet to its neighbor that is located closest to the 
destination. There are several ideas to define the means of 
nearest node to destination such as Euclidean distance to the 
destination, the deviation from the imaginary line between 
source to destination and etc. [10,11]. 
 
In Following, some geographical routing protocols are 
reviewed briefly. 
4.1. GPSR- Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routings 
The Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing is one of the 
usually used location-based routing protocols for launching 
and maintaining a sensor network. This protocol practically 
functions in a stateless manner and has the capability for 
multi-path routing. In GPSR, it is supposed that all nodes 
identify the geographical position of destination node with 
which communication is wanted. This location information 
(i.e.) geographical position is also used to route traffic to its 
required destination from the source node through the 
shortest path. Each transmitted data packet from node 
consist the destination node’s identification and its 
geographical position similar two four-byte float numbers. 
Each node also frequently transmits a beacon to notify its 
near nodes relating to its recent geographical co-ordinates. 
The node positions are recorded, maintained and updated in 
a neighborhood table by all nodes receiving the beacon. To 
eliminate the overhead due to regular beacons, the node 
positions are carried onto forwarded data packets. GPSR 
supports two mechanisms for forwarding data packets: 
greedy forwarding and perimeter forwarding [12]. 
4.2. RGR-Receiver Based Forwarding for 
Geographical Routing Protocol. 
Receiver Based Forwarding is an efficient approach for 
improving geographical sensor that is suggested and 
developed in December 2004 by Rodrigo Fonseca and et al. 
in Berkeley University. It is clear that in wireless sensor 
networks, when a message is transmit from one node to 
another; all the sender’s neighbours can hear that message. 
According this feature, the main difference of this idea with 
GPSR is in packet forwarding because instead of sender 
decides to forward packet, the receivers determine next hop 
of packet. Scilicet, when a sender wants to transmit 
messages, instead of addressed to a specific neighbour, the 
receivers recognize that whether they should forward a 
message or not. As mentioned earlier, the flooding issue 
occurs when one node receives data packet, spreads it to all 
its neighbours. To prevent a flooding issue in this protocol, 
just if the location of neighbour is closer to destination than 
the previous sender, the message should be transmitted 
again. The computation of distance between each node from 
destination is done by using its coordinates. Also, each 
message contains a header that some information likes the 
coordinates of last sender and final node. So, with 
comparing the distance of current node to destination and 
the distance of pervious node to destination can decision 
about closeness to goal. 
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Figure1: Receiver-based protocol. Potential Forwarders (Fonseca & Sanz-
Merino, 2004) 
According this method, a neighbour that is nearer than 
sender can retransmit message but it is wasting energy. To 
avoid this approach, for all nodes was designed a timer 
which set it before forwarding message. Timer is adjusted 
based on closeness to destination. So, the neighbour that is 
closer to destination set a smaller timer than the nodes that 
are farther and its priority is higher. After that, if one 
neighbour listens to another neighbour forwarding while 
waiting for the timeout, it does not forward. 
 
This routing protocol claim that it can prevent from 
spreading duplicates messages. So, if a node has 
broadcasted a copy of message, it does not retransmit 
following ones. To perform this, it is not sufficient to 
identify duplicates based on the header of message, because 
malicious nodes can modify the header of message. So, the 
identification method is carried out based on content and 
header of message [13]. 
4.3. S-GPSR–Secured Greedy Perimeter Stateless 
Routing Protocol. 
As it mentioned before, GPSR is a routing protocol that 
used for geographic sensors but it is also exposed to various 
types of attackers. Another method which is suggested in 
2010 by Samundiswary for protecting GPSR against some 
attacks such as sinkhole is called S-GPSR. In this method, is 
tried to joining trust based mechanism in the existing greedy 
perimeter stateless routing protocol prepares a secure 
routing protocol. 
 
As mentioned in GPSR method, at first, each node during 
packet forwarding to a familiar destination must scan its 
neighbourhoods table to acquire the next hop which is 
optimal and leads to the goal. So, it selects the node that has 
the minimum distance to a specific destination. One of the 
newest methods for increasing the level of security in GPSR 
is using a trusted base approach in the neighbourhoods table 
to generate the most confident distance route rather than the 
default minimal distance. This is called S-GPSR.  
 
The main component to implement the trust model in S-
GPSR is Trust Update Interval (TUI) that used in each 
forward packet that is buffered in the nodes. The duration 
that each node should be waited before dedicating a trust or 
mistrust level to a node, is computed by TUI.  Later than a 
node transmits a packet to its neighbour, it waits the 
neighbour’s reaction for packet forwarding. So, this node 
faces to various situations. In the first case, the level trusted 
of node increased if neighbour forwards the packet in 
appropriate manner based on TUI. On the other hand, the 
level trust of node is declined if the packet is modified by 
the neighbour in an unsuitable way or it does not send the 
packet to next hop.  
 
Each node in S-GPSR must perform two tasks, forward 
packet to its neighbour and control this packet. It is vital to 
check the integrity of forwarded packet by sender to verify 
the different fields in the forwarded IP packet. Therefore, 
confirming the acts of neighbour nods and enhancing the 
trust level is depended on succeeding the check of integrity. 
Vice versa, if the check of integrity fails or the neighbour 
node cannot broadcast packet, the node is treated as 
malicious node and the trust level decreases [14]. 
4.4. T-GPSR-  Trusted Greedy Primeter Stateless 
Routing 
During packet transmission to a known host, GPSR scans its 
neighbourhood table to retrieve the optimal next hop leading 
to the destination. As there may be more than one such hop 
available, GPSR selects an adjacent neighbour that has the 
least distance to a particular destination. In this protocol it is 
attempted to modify this rule and associate the computed 
trust level of a node along with its geographical position in 
the neighborhood table due to protect GPSR against Black 
hole attack. In order to create the most trusted route rather 
than the default minimal distance route, the trust levels are 
utilized with the geographical distances. 
 
To implement the trust derivation mechanism, a node 
buffers (GPSR Agent::buffer packet) each forwarded packet 
for the Trust Update Interval (TUI). The TUI is a very 
critical component of such a trust model and determines the 
time a node should wait before assigning a trust or distrust 
level to a no debased upon the results of a particular event. 
After transmission, each node promiscuously listens for the 
neighbouring node to forward the packet. If the neighbour 
forwards the packet in the proper manner (correct 
modification if required) within the TUI, its corresponding 
trust level is incremented. However, if the neighbouring 
node modifies the packet in a unexpected manner or does 
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not forward the packet at all, its trust level is decremented 
[15]. 
4.5. BSR-RRS and BSR-ANS –Boundary State 
Routing. 
Contention BSR is implemented using the combination of 
Greedy Bounded Compass forwarding and the Boundary 
Mapping. In BSR protocol, Failure of geographic 
forwarding due to local minima only arises on void 
boundaries and the outer boundary. Previous research by 
Karp investigated the probing of boundaries to accumulate 
the link state information in boundary nodes. Boundary 
State Routing (BSR) relies upon Greedy-Bounded-Compass 
forwarding. Compass forwarding selects the neighbour on 
the closest angle to the destination. This protocol like GPSR 
does not have any security feature. In order to prevent 
wormhole attack against BSR, two methods is designed that 
called BSR-RRS and BSR-ANS. Reverse Route Scheme 
(RRS)use hop-count technic to find malicious nodes but 
Authentication of Nodes Scheme (ANS) is based on 
authentication to find the not honest nodes [16].   
5. Simulation and analysis 
Simulation is one of the important steps in any survey 
because it allows to investigator for simulating and testing 
its idea in the virtual area that likes a real world. In order to 
simulate these routing protocols, NS-2 is selected.It is 
assumed that among 50 to 200 nodes are deployed randomly 
in 500*500 areas. In the following table some of the 
important parameters are mentioned. 
 
Simulation Parameters Values 
Number of Nodes 50 and 200 
Geographical environment 500*500 
Size of Packet (bytes) 512 
Traffic Type CBR 
Number of malicious nodes Depend on type of attack (2-25) 
Mobility model Depend on type of routing (Static or Random way point) 
Pause time(s) 20 
Simulation time(s) 100 
Table 1: simulation parameters 
Deliver ratio is one of the useful measurement 
parameters in order to prove the efficiency of these secure 
protocol in which it is tried to calculate the numbers of 
packets received by destination nodes divide to the number 
of packets are sent by source nodes. 
5.1. T-GPSR and GPSR against Blackhole Attack 
As it is mentioned, T-GPSR is a protocol that is designed to 
protect GPSR against Black hole attack. In order to check 
the efficiency of this protocol, 50 nodes are deployed in the 
area randomly. This protocol support random mobility in 
any way. As it is shown in the following chart, the T-GPSR 
has a better reaction against this attack when the numbers of 
malicious nodes increase. This method can improve the 
delivery ratio rate to 80 percent.  
 
5.2. S-GPSR and GPSR against Selective forwarding 
Attack 
The main purpose to design S-GPSR is to protect GPSR 
against selective forwarding attack by using trusted model. 
To evaluate this method, 100 nodes are deployed in the 
500*500 (m2) environments. When the number of malicious 
nodes is among 5 to 15, deliver ratio of S-GPSR is about 70 
percent. Finally, the rate of delivery in S-GPSR is more than 
GPSR, clearly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3: Deliver ratio for S-GPSR and GPSR against Selective Forwarding 
Attack (Mobile) 
Figure 2: Deliver ratio for T-GPSR and GPSR against Black hole 
Attack 
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5.3. RGR and GPSR against Selective Forwarding and 
Wormhole Attack 
RGR is a method that was suggested for static 
geographic routing protocol based on GPSR in order to 
increase the security level of it. The rate of packet delivery 
for RGR and GPSR are illustrated in figure 4. This chart is 
shown thatRGR by using multipath method is more 
protected against selective forwarding attack than GPSR. 
For example, when 10 malicious nodes exist in the network, 
RGR’s delivery ratio is higher than 80 percent, 
approximately. (It is important to mention that RGR is 
usable for static sensor networks but S-GPSR support 
mobility, so the comparison of them is not logical.) 
 
 
Figure 4: Deliver ratio for RGR and GPSR against Selective Forwarding 
Attack (Static) 
In the next situation, it is tried to prove that RGR is 
protected against Wormhole attack but GPSR do not have 
any features against this attack. As it is shown in the 
following figure, the rate of delivery is approached to less 
than 10 percentwhen the number of malicious nodes is more 
than 4 in GPSR but RGR has a better reaction against this 
attack. 
Figure 5: Deliver ratio for RGR and GPSR against Wormhole Attack 
(Static) 
5.4. BSR, BSR-RRS andBSR-ANS against Wormhole 
Attack 
BSR is a geographic routing protocol that used 
Greedy-Bounded-Compass to forward packet through 
destination in which there are not any security features. To 
secure this method against wormhole attack two method 
was suggested. BSR-RRS is the first method that tries to 
identify wormhole attack by utilizing Hop-Count technic. 
Based on this model, the number of hop from source to 
destination is compared to the number of hops through 
destination to source. In the next method that is called BSR-
ANS, use cryptographic authentication in order to find the 
malicious node. The following figure is shown the rate of 
packet that is received in the destination to the number of 
packets which are sent. It is clear that ANS is the best model 
among these three methods by using digital signature of 
nodes. As it clear RRS cannot protect sensor network 
against wormhole attack completely.    
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we review the secure geographic routing 
protocols. We also discuss about why some of routing 
protocols protect against some attack. Hence there are 
metrics to evaluate the protocols namely localization 
information (GPS), authentication, integrity and trust 
modeIn order to improve their level of security.  We 
simulated the protocols based on the delivery ratio. A 
qualitative comparison of secure routing protocols is 
summarized in table 2. 
 
 
Figure 6: Deliver ratio in BSR-ANS is more than BSR-RRS and 
BSR against wormhole attack with mobility 
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Routing 
Protocol 
Localization 
Information(GPS) 
Authentication Integrity Trust model 
TGPSR  No   
SGPSR  No   
RGR  No  No 
BSR-RRS  No No No 
BSR-ANS   No No 
TABLE 2: QUALITATIVE COMPARISON OF SECURE  ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
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